Opinion article by Ilona Bērziņa
The European Union’s ban on the transit of Belarusian potash fertilizers through Europe is generating at least half a billion US dollars in annual revenue for the aggressor state, Russia. While Russia is contentedly counting its “potash money,” developing countries—many of which depend on these fertilizer shipments—are facing an increasing risk of hunger. Europeans will also feel the impact, as reduced fertilizer imports will significantly raise food production costs, ultimately affecting food prices.
The United States has lifted sanctions on several Belarusian companies—fertilizer producers. Nevertheless, traditional transit routes for Belarusian potash through EU countries remain closed or heavily restricted. Even when shipments are not intended for the European Union market, their transit through Latvia to third countries is prohibited. Rising fertilizer prices continue to increase the risk of hunger in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America, while access for poorer farmers has sharply declined.
The fertilizer crisis has been further aggravated by the conflict in Iran. The impact is particularly severe for nitrogen-based fertilizers—especially urea and ammonia—because the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz are key transit hubs for these products and their raw materials.
The UN International Trade Centre estimates that roughly one-third of global urea trade normally passes through this route, while the Food and Agriculture Organization warns that disruptions in this corridor immediately drive up energy and fertilizer costs.
In practical terms, this means reduced availability, higher prices, and delivery delays.
According to reporting by Reuters, India’s urea import prices nearly doubled within a few months to around 1,000 dollars per ton. Industry officials warn that this will also increase costs for smaller buyers in Asia and Africa.
Nitrogen fertilizers are the most sensitive to these disruptions because they are closely linked to natural gas and exports from the Persian Gulf. Phosphate fertilizers are also affected, as sulfur prices rose by about 35% following disruptions in the Hormuz corridor. At the same time, the UN reports a more than 90% drop in tanker traffic through the route, raising the risk of crop losses in countries with tight planting schedules.
In this context, Belarusian fertilizers could provide a solution—but EU sanctions make this practically impossible. The paradox of these well-intentioned sanctions is that they allow Russia to earn approximately half a billion US dollars annually from fertilizer transit, funds that can be used to finance the war against Ukraine.
To illustrate:
last year, Belarus exported around 12 million tons of fertilizers using Russian railways and ports in Saint Petersburg,
as well as ports in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions. Approximately 85% of this volume was transported via the Baltic Sea.
The minimum logistics cost in Russia is about 48 dollars per ton. This means that transportation services alone generate around 576 million dollars annually, with port handling services accounting for at least 240 million dollars of that amount.
Although the aim of sanctions is to weaken aggressor states economically and demonstrate political solidarity with Ukraine, in reality they are strengthening Russia. The roughly half a billion dollars earned annually from Belarusian fertilizer exports is effectively transformed into bombs and missiles that fall on Ukrainian cities.
Historically, fertilizer shipments were handled through ports in Latvia and Lithuania. Today, they are redirected to ports such as Ust-Luga and others in Russia. On a global scale, these shipments do not disappear—they are simply rerouted, ultimately feeding Russia’s war treasury.
Read also: The hidden side of sanctions: fertilizer shortages threaten global food security
Read also: Political scientist: If the US lifts sanctions on fertiliser shipments, there are serious reasons behind it