A few days after speaking with Jānis Kasalis, President of the Latvian Stevedoring Companies Association (LSA), and Ivars Landmanis, Chairman of the LSA Council, about the future of the transit industry, including grain shipments through Latvia, we learned the first results of analyses of grain transported in transit. It turned out that the grain did not originate in Ukraine. Therefore, the first part of this interview will focus primarily on the controversial grain issue, while the second part, addressing the future of the transit industry, will be published next week.
Before discussing grain transit, could you explain the transit industry’s overall contribution to Latvia’s economy?
Jānis Kasalis: Our industry’s annual contribution amounts to between 4% and 6% of gross domestic product (GDP). By comparison, agriculture, forestry and fisheries combined contribute approximately 4%.
Correct me if I am wrong, but transit is not just about ports. It also involves railways, logistics companies, cargo handlers and road transport. The entire sector is enormous.
Ivars Landmanis: There are also service providers, railway wagon and transport leasing companies, construction companies, and manufacturers and repairers of machinery and equipment. Many industries are involved in this process.
Jānis Kasalis: I think there is another group of employees we rarely mention in this context: civil servants.
If transit operations were to cease, many of them would have considerably less work to do. If the government plans to reduce the number of civil servants over the next five years, they should also consider where they would work in the future. Therefore, maintaining transit operations is, quite frankly, also in the interests of civil servants.
Russian grain transit through Latvia has become a politically and economically sensitive issue. There is much talk about “Russia’s bloody grain”, but far less discussion about the fact that this grain actually belongs to American and European companies that have purchased it and are now transporting it through Latvia to other countries. How important is this category of cargo to Latvia’s railways, ports and stevedoring companies?
Jānis Kasalis: You have identified precisely the issue that is usually left undiscussed. I do not know where the description “bloody” originated, but in my opinion, it is politically exaggerated and unjustified. I think Latvia is the only country in the world where this category of cargo is described in such terms. I would not agree with that description because, in my view, there is no evidence to support it. People who use this hashtag are often motivated by political considerations or a lack of knowledge. Of course, we verify the origin of cargo in our commercial operations. However, this description raises many questions. I believe its main purpose is to attract attention.
Ivars Landmanis: We have always maintained that every shipment matters. According to current figures, approximately two million tonnes of grain could be transported through Latvia by the end of the year. This also helps cover railway operating costs.If one tonne of grain contributes approximately €17–20 to Latvia’s economy, simple arithmetic gives us €34–40 million. That means less need for state budget subsidies for the railway. Ports can better maintain their infrastructure, while grain-handling terminals can continue operating and paying their employees.
Jānis Kasalis: This money also generates social security contributions, personal income tax and, where companies make profits, corporate income tax, as well as various fees paid to the state and municipalities. As an association, we are not specifically advocating Russian grain transit as such.
However, we see two risks if Latvia unilaterally bans these or other shipments without a European Union decision. The first is the possibility of a disproportionate response from Russia, such as completely blocking cargo flows from Central Asia to Latvia. Russia would need only a single order to implement such a measure.
The second risk involves potential legal proceedings with the European Commission and companies whose commercial activities would be affected by the restrictions. Experts have now emerged who previously worked in Valdis Dombrovskis’s office and claim that Latvia could have imposed such restrictions all along. Yet during previous governments, they did nothing to enable Latvia to ban transit unilaterally without EU sanctions. We do not see such a possibility. It is also worth mentioning what the European Union’s Special Envoy for International Sanctions, David O’Sullivan, told journalists. When asked whether Latvia could ban grain transit, he replied that Latvia could not do so unilaterally and that the European Union does not include grain, as a food commodity, in its sanctions. I think that single sentence says more than we could explain in 20 pages and five interviews.
At the protest in Jēkabpils, Andris Kulbergs promised that the government would work on the issue and introduce a draft law the following week prohibiting new contracts for Russian grain transit. However, the process will not move that quickly. At the same time, he pointed out that Latvia should seek a common decision at EU level because a unilateral ban could create substantial financial liabilities. What does this mean?
Jānis Kasalis: I think we need to consider the emotional circumstances. If one person is confronted by 200 others shouting at him, he may say things that should not subsequently be subjected to a word-for-word legal analysis. In my opinion, the main promise was “we will work on it”. That is what he said: we will work on it.
I would not analyse the rest from a legal perspective because it was not an official address.After all, it was an event dominated by shouted slogans, and not everything said there is legally binding.
Ivars Landmanis: Looking at what subsequently happens on social media, I regard such events, to some extent, as contributing to divisions within society. Essentially, the protest is not directed solely against Russian grain. It is also directed against the companies that own the grain, international traders, Latvian ports, the railway and all of us who pay for its maintenance. If we examine what proportion of Russia’s total exports this grain represents, the impact on Russia is small.
Jānis Kasalis: Even if we handled two million tonnes by the end of the year, that would represent only a few percent of Russian exports.We fully understand that this grain can be transported along alternative routes.
Russia has sufficient grain storage capacity in its silos, where, unlike in Latvia, grain can be stored for extended periods and subsequently sold in smaller quantities. When people who do not understand economics once again manipulate figures, we end up overestimating Latvia’s importance. If Latvia really were such an important player, we as an association would probably be the first to say: stop everything and end the war!
But that is not how it works. Within this bubble, people reinforce and encourage one another.I am somewhat surprised by the involvement of certain charitable organisations in these processes because they, too, should consider where their donors’ money comes from. If we reduce economic activity, we have less money available to donate to Ukraine. Essentially, we are taking money from the aggressor’s economy, and part of that money goes towards supporting Ukraine.I think that is excellent! However, if we shut down the industry, some people will leave the country, while some businesses will operate at a loss. What benefit would that bring to Latvia’s economy? None.
Ivars Landmanis: The costs of transporting domestic cargo will increase.If transit flows continue to decline, stevedoring companies may have to close their businesses and dismiss employees.If the state imposes restrictions, companies will demand compensation because port infrastructure cannot simply be relocated, and the state previously supported efforts to attract investors. If the government fails to act, more public forms of protest will also be considered.
One argument raised during protests against grain transit is that local grain producers cannot find space in ports because terminals are supposedly full of Russian grain.
Jānis Kasalis: First, we need to understand how grain trading works. Ports generally do not have direct contracts with farmers, except in certain cases. Usually, the contract is with a trader or grain purchaser who subsequently sells the grain. Farmers deliver their grain wherever the trader instructs them to, meaning they generally do not choose the port themselves.
It is possible that Latvia’s largest farms sell their grain independently and conclude direct contracts, but these are individual cases.
This season has already ended. Latvian farmers have already exported a large proportion of their grain. The cargo is either at the port, has already been transported away or remains in storage facilities.
Therefore, such problems are not even theoretically possible at present.
However, looking ahead to next year and the next harvest, we certainly intend to meet with grain producer groups, explain the situation and seek solutions to minimise misunderstandings and speculation.
Of course, there will always be businesses that spread such information to strengthen their negotiating positions regarding cargo-handling tariffs. We regard that as normal. Nevertheless, together with our association members, we will certainly look for ways to provide clear information about what is happening at each port.
For both Latvian Railways and ourselves, Latvian cargo is a priority.We do not place it at any disadvantage in favour of shipments from our eastern neighbours.
Ivars Landmanis: Ports are cargo-handling points, and they need cargo turnover to operate.
We cannot have a situation where local grain is delivered to a terminal and remains there for months without being shipped onwards. This needs to be discussed, and common ground must be found between the industries.
Suppose Latvia nevertheless introduces a unilateral ban on grain transit and these shipments disappear. What would happen to the maintenance of railway and port infrastructure? Who would compensate for the lost revenue?
Ivars Landmanis: If Latvia makes such a decision unilaterally, the cargo will move elsewhere – to Lithuania, Poland or Russia. There is also the risk of Russian retaliation affecting cargo from Central Asia.
According to 2025 figures, cargo from Central Asia and Russia together amounted to approximately 5.2 million tonnes. If this flow were stopped, we would lose approximately €180 million in revenue. That would also mean substantially higher railway maintenance costs. The railway and other infrastructure would require an additional €70–80 million in subsidies. If this is Latvia’s decision, terminals will most likely suffer as well because maintaining them will become more difficult. The cost of transporting domestic cargo, including Latvian grain, will increase. That raises the question: will farmers themselves cover these costs, or will the state once again have to provide subsidies simply to make it possible to transport the domestic harvest for export? It is a chain reaction. International legal proceedings are also possible.
If we reach a situation where state budget revenue declines because of a wave of bankruptcies among transit companies and related businesses, would that mean there is no alternative but to raise taxes elsewhere?
Jānis Kasalis: I think so. And those are only the direct consequences. There are also indirect effects.If Latvia begins introducing sanctions or restrictions unilaterally, international investors could very quickly lose interest in our industry. Domestic cargo volumes are insufficient for the railway, ports and private terminals to rely exclusively on them. If Latvia is perceived as a country that disregards European Commission decisions and international trade rules, and instead makes political decisions based on emotions rather than economic calculations and international regulations, that will create a serious reputational risk.
Existing investors may abandon further investment, and attracting new investors will become more difficult. Foreign investment is extremely important to any economy.
Ivars Landmanis: Attracting transit cargo is very difficult.It requires sustained effort over a long period, and much depends on reputation. The negative consequences could persist for years.
If the state restricts economic activity for political, security-related, emotional or other reasons, should it not establish some form of support mechanism for companies whose businesses have effectively been destroyed by those decisions?
Ivars Landmanis: During the European Union’s sugar reform, sugar factories in Latvia were closed.
Compensation was paid for businesses that had to close as a result of political decisions. A similar situation occurred in the fishing industry when catch quotas were reduced. People could choose whether to continue operating their businesses or scrap their vessels and receive compensation. In my opinion, a similar approach is needed in this case. If the state decides that a particular business activity will no longer be permitted, it cannot simply tell entrepreneurs who previously invested in it entirely legally: that’s it, shut everything down!
I believe that would also lead to lawsuits and claims against the state.There is another important aspect. We can close our borders and lose cargo, reputation and investors, but taxpayers will have to pay more to maintain infrastructure. If we cannot maintain port infrastructure, including harbour waters, we will also lose other cargo – shipments that do not arrive by rail but come by sea. The cost of maintaining harbour depths per tonne of cargo will become extremely high. This is particularly relevant to Ventspils, where some cargo arrives by sea and is subsequently transported onwards by sea.
In that case, would NATO cargo and NATO vessels also be unable to enter if harbour depths were insufficient?
Jānis Kasalis: NATO has its own requirements for both cargo transport and port specifications. These requirements are strict and must be met. That does not mean ports would cease operating altogether. However, the number of companies would decline, port authorities would optimise their territories, and maintaining harbour depths and berths would remain among the most expensive activities.
If cargo volumes fall substantially, we can also expect the industry to contract economically, both in terms of the number of companies and the scale of operations. The ability to accommodate large vessels would diminish, and vessel sizes and other parameters would change. If we consider only Latvia’s agricultural sector, a port would effectively operate for approximately six months a year.
For the remaining six months, it would resemble a seasonal café that closes outside the tourist season.
We can imagine how much that would cost and who would have to pay for it. Maintaining current port depths would no longer be economically justified. Smaller vessels would enter the ports, making the cost of transporting each tonne of cargo to global markets even higher.
Looking at the current situation, which categories of cargo have we already lost permanently? Which ones can we say are gone and will not return?
Jānis Kasalis: Coal must be mentioned first among the cargo categories we have lost. Interestingly, however, some individual projects are now beginning to reappear. The decline in coal volumes is not solely related to the war. It is also influenced by Europe’s transition to alternative energy sources and developments in global markets. However, given this year’s energy crisis and high gas prices, some countries are once again prepared to return to coal.
Ultimately, every country must ensure that its people can maintain a reasonable standard of living. When energy prices become excessively high, they significantly affect living standards in any country.
Another category is mineral fertilisers. Cargo flows from Russia and Belarus had already largely declined before the war or as a result of sanctions.
However, mineral fertilisers also arrive at our ports from other sources, including the European Union, countries outside the EU and Central Asia.
This demonstrates that ports, including our traders and buyers, are capable of adapting.
Ivars Landmanis: Mineral fertiliser transit was primarily an issue for Lithuania, but following the introduction of sanctions, Lithuania also lost these shipments.
They are now transported mainly through Russian ports, which generate revenue from handling them.
Metal and ore shipments have also been lost, with these cargo flows similarly redirected to Russian ports.
It has been estimated that Russia’s ports and transit industry earn approximately €2 billion annually from mineral fertiliser handling and logistics, while Russia’s total export revenue from mineral fertilisers reaches between $16 billion and $18 billion a year.
Ivars Landmanis: In my opinion, this is an example of how a poorly considered decision can sometimes produce the opposite result to what was intended.
If the objective was to prevent Russian ports from generating revenue, the outcome in this case was the opposite.
