Opinion article
Latvia closed its doors to Belarusian potash fertilisers, hoping to halt their flow to other countries. But the cargo did not disappear. It simply went elsewhere — and today it is feeding Russia’s railways and ports. A sanctions instrument that was intended to curb revenues for authoritarian regimes in the region has, in practice, become a source of income for Russia’s logistics sector.
Although the United States eased sanctions against Belarus at the end of last year, including those related to potash exports, restrictions remain in force in Latvia prohibiting the import, purchase and transit of Belarusian potash fertilisers through European Union territory. Transit through Latvia to third countries is also banned.
Industry analysts note that this has significantly affected the region’s logistics sector. Cargo that previously moved through Baltic ports is now being redirected to Russian infrastructure — particularly to the ports of Ust-Luga and St. Petersburg. Transit fees, port service revenues and related tax payments are now flowing into the Russian budget.
Meanwhile, Belarusian fertiliser exports continue. The main producer, Belaruskali, is one of the world’s largest players in the potash market. These fertilisers are critically important for global agriculture, and demand remains steady. This means the flow has not been stopped — it has been rerouted.
The result is clear: Russian Railways and Russian ports are generating significant windfall profits
from the transit of Belarusian fertilisers. The Russian state budget benefits.
For Latvia, this is not an abstract issue. For decades, transit has been one of the pillars of the national economy — providing jobs, tax revenues and infrastructure development. Every tonne that bypasses Latvian ports means less work in the logistics chain, lower state budget revenues and reduced capacity to maintain strategic infrastructure. By restoring fertiliser transit through Latvian ports, the sector could, with its current resources, generate approximately 120 million euros per year for the national economy. This would help reduce state subsidies for the railway, restore employment in national ports and ease social tensions.
The issue also has a security dimension. The weaker Latvia’s transit sector becomes, the greater the burden on other sectors of the economy and on the state budget. At the same time, Russia’s logistics sector receives additional income from cargo that was previously handled in the Baltics.
If the cargo is reaching global markets anyway — only now through Russian infrastructure — Latvia has the right to ask a clear question: does the current model reduce the aggressor state’s economic capacity, or have we voluntarily surrendered a market that Russia now serves?
Ignoring this reality means accepting a situation in which the sanctions mechanism creates losses for Latvia while generating additional revenue for Russia.
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