Opinion article by Ilona Bērziņa
Global sanctions against Russia and Belarus were introduced with a clear political objective — to weaken the economies of aggressor states. However, these decisions also have a less discussed side effect: they impact global food security. Mineral fertilizers are one of the most essential agricultural resources, and their availability directly determines how much food can be produced. If fertilizers are in short supply, yields decline — leading to higher food prices and an increased risk of hunger for millions of people.
This issue particularly affects Africa, South Asia, and Latin America, where agriculture is already exposed to climate risks and resource shortages. In these regions, disruptions in fertilizer supplies are not merely an economic inconvenience but a matter of survival.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Latvia — within the framework of the UN World Food Programme — has allowed the export of tens of thousands of tonnes of Russian-origin fertilizers that belonged to companies under European Union sanctions and had been frozen on Latvian territory. Last year, a shipment of 30,000 tonnes of fertilizers was sent to Bangladesh. Four earlier shipments — totaling 130,000 tonnes — were delivered in 2023 and 2024 to Kenya, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka, according to information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
This is a significant humanitarian step, but on the scale of the global food crisis, such shipments are only a temporary solution. Ensuring stable crop yields in countries where millions live on the brink of hunger requires a continuous supply of fertilizers, not one-off donations.
At the beginning of the war in Ukraine, then Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs emphasized that
one of the West’s efforts is to provide so-called Global South countries with grain and fertilizers.
This is also a way to counter Russian propaganda, which seeks to convince the world that rising food prices are caused by Western sanctions.
However, the sanctions policy itself raises complex questions. Belarus remains one of the world’s largest producers of mineral fertilizers, particularly potash. The state-owned company Belaruskalij and other Belarusian producers are major players in the global market, and their output is critical for agriculture in many regions.
In December last year, the United States partially eased sanctions on Belarusian fertilizer exports, citing food security concerns. Meanwhile, the European Union has maintained these sanctions, even as fertilizer shortages in many countries translate into lower yields and a higher risk of food deficits.
Crucially, these shipments do not disappear.
If the Baltic states do not handle them, the fertilizers are simply redirected elsewhere — primarily through Russian infrastructure.
Last year, Belarus exported approximately 12 million tonnes of fertilizers using Russian railways and ports — including those in St. Petersburg, as well as in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions. Around 85% of this volume was transported via the Baltic Sea.
The minimum logistics cost in Russia is about 48 dollars per tonne. This means that the value of transport services alone reaches approximately 576 million dollars annually, with port handling services accounting for at least 240 million dollars.
In other words, the cargo does not vanish — it simply starts generating revenue elsewhere.
This creates a paradox: while sanctions are intended to target aggressor states, they simultaneously contribute to a situation in which Russian infrastructure and budget continue to benefit, while access to fertilizers becomes increasingly difficult in the world’s poorest countries.
Read also: Political scientist: If the US lifts sanctions on fertiliser shipments, there are serious reasons behind it