Since February 2022 different mass media outlets have been reporting more and more claims and assumptions regarding possible political changes within Russia’s power system, predicting, for example, Russian President Vladimir Putin losing power or Russia collapsing economically or regionally, notes Latvian Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB).
On Thursday, 24 November, SAB published the third article from its series of analytical articles about different important societal issues. This time SAB offers comments about the stability of Vladimir Putin’s regime and analyses the possibility of different political changes.
According to SAB, Russia’s political system has been relatively stable for a long time, but the war in Ukraine, its length, as well as Ukraine’s and the west’s resistance have only increased tension in society and among the political elite. The regime employs various tactics to preserve the status quo, but this also causes long-term risks.
The current regime in Russia is the result of more than 20 years of consolidation with Vladimir Putin as the central fulcrum of power. The authority of the Russian president in the existing regime stems from the wide authority this post has in foreign and domestic policy, as well as Putin’s role as the balancing element between different political and economic influence and interest groups, preventing individual groups from receiving a dominant position. The groups of influence forming the system and their relationships are not static, and they may compete or cooperate with one another from time to time, changing the way they can influence political directions.
One of the objectives of this system is ensuring stability and guarding its leader – Putin – from criticisms. Instead he is presented as a successful leader and a protector of Russia and its residents.
The weak point of this regime is rapid and systematic instability in a situation when the president becomes powerless and is no longer considered strong enough to defend the country’s or the influencing group’s interests, notes SAB. Under this system, formed around Putin, there are no procedures on how to act if the leader is replaced, which may lead to fights over which group gets the president’s seat.
Considering this narrow range within the confines of which all decisions are made and considering the failures of those decisions, Russia’s war in Ukraine is putting pressure on Putin’s positions and his system, forcing representatives of multiple groups to voice dissatisfaction with groups responsible for the war more and more loudly. At the same time, according to SAB, publicly criticising Putin is dangerous, even though there have been some cases in the public space.
SAB believes in the current situation the possibility of a coup in Russia is low.
The existing competition and discord among those groups, which is related to political opportunism, is within the borders of the system, but it does not put at risk the political course or the system’s existence. The elite are trying to dodge responsibility for the recent failures. Supporters of aggressive warfare are using it to increase their political capital and influence on the battlefield and internal policy. Russian Ministry of Defence and armed forces, on the other hand, are branded as scapegoats, which weakens their positions and makes them attractive goals for ambitions of other opportunists, SAB stresses.
In the current situation an uprising against the regime has too many risks for the elite. To avoid putting their own positions and access to resources at risk, the elite is forced to adapt to the existing situation, including consolidation around Putin. These members of the lite may change their mind if the Russian army suffers defeat on the battlefield, since they don’t want to be among the losers. The Russian elite may be influenced by rapidly declining health of the president, which would undermine his ability to manage the country. However, SAB stresses that
at the moment there is no reason to assume Putin’s health is poor enough to threaten the stability of the regime.
In the last several years the Kremlin has made aggressive moves to stomp out any kind of political opposition and independent media, drastically reducing their ability to participate in decision-making and influence Russia’s strategic course. In their domestic message the Kremlin regularly employs arguments about Russia’s survival and the fight against Russia’s traitors. This deters potential activists from taking action, as measures are taken in order to discredit all who have objections to Kremlin’s employed policy. This is illustrated by the recent mobilisation performed in Russia, which fuels public dissatisfaction with the country’s political course and socioeconomic tension in Russia. But without opposition leaders and strong independent media Russian residents lean towards adapting to the situation to avoid a counter-reaction from the regime. Because of this reason large-scale protests are not expected to happen soon, even though local and isolated pockets of discontent already happen and are possible in the future. The need to ensure conformism and political apathy is one of the reason why intelligence and security services have upped their positions in Russia lately.
Potential political instability also suggests the possibility of Russia’s territorial disintegration. This, too, is considered unlikely.
At the same time, in some areas, such as North Caucasus and national republics, there are some embers for resistance, especially based on ethnic and religious differences among residents in Russia. Nevertheless, Russia’s regions are closely tied to the state and are dependent on it both financially and energy-wise. Regions also lack experience and tools for political independence. Governments of regions answer to Moscow, which limits their ability to act autonomously. The need for autonomy or even independence may surface if Moscow’s positions weaken as a result of domestic infighting, for example. This could also affect the ability of intelligence and security services keep locals under control.
So far Russia has been able to ensure financial stability. This is largely thanks to high prices on energy resources. But the ongoing need to divert resources in order to stabilise the economy, combined with growth war costs, means Russia’s costs are starting to outweigh its revenue. This trend is expected to continue for several years. To compensate this, Russia has created reserves. There is also the option to mobilise economic resources. This would allow Russia to cover lost revenue while putting at risk the economy’s development.
Generally the possibility of a change of leadership in Russia due to Putin losing his positions, due to health problems or a coup is unlikely. The Russian elite is partially consolidated around Putin as the sole guarantor of the existing system. SAB believes that if the existing political elite in Russia remains, no changes are possible in Russia’s foreign policy course. The country will continue performing measures to maintain control over its imagined sphere of influence and will continue directing actions to influence other country’s policies in a direction favourable to Russia.
More on this topic: SAB: Belarus should be viewed as threat to the region, similarly to Russia