Russia’s statements about a possible war against Europe are largely rhetorical, as while it is fighting in Ukraine it lacks the military resources required for a direct conflict. In the near term, the greater risk to the European Union (EU) lies in a potential escalation of Russian hybrid attacks, said Jānis Kapustāns, a lecturer at the Latvian National Defence Academy, in an assessment for the news agency LETA.
Commenting on increasingly tense relations between Russia and the EU, Kapustāns recalled that following the restoration of independence by the Baltic states and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the situation was almost the opposite: Russia enjoyed significantly better relations with the EU than with NATO. At the time, major EU countries such as Germany and France invested heavily in Russia, large companies operated there, and Russia was keen on cooperation with the EU.
Kapustāns stressed that the situation changed fundamentally after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Although the EU is often criticised as a large and bureaucratic organisation that struggles to act swiftly due to its 27 member states, he noted that after the war began the EU responded firmly—arguably even more decisively than the United States—by introducing sanctions that were gradually strengthened.
The lecturer pointed out that the EU plans to phase out imports of Russian gas, with some restrictions taking effect as early as 2026 and a final deadline set for 2027. This includes countries that are still purchasing Russian gas, such as Hungary and Slovakia. According to Kapustāns, this demonstrates the EU’s capacity to act and the strength of the instruments at its disposal.
Kapustāns also referred to the influence of the administration of US President Donald Trump,
noting that once Trump officially took office, US policy towards the EU became “rather unfriendly,” a situation Russia is attempting to exploit. He explained that in talks on Ukraine, the US seeks dialogue with Russia while also engaging Ukraine, but Europe is increasingly sidelined.
As an example, Kapustāns cited an early proposal reportedly consisting of 28 points, one of which involved Ukraine’s reconstruction using EU funds. Such an approach, he argued, would create a situation in which the US and Russia reach agreements while the EU pays the bill without being involved in decision-making. He emphasised that the EU can provide financial support only if it is directly involved in the decisions, not when others decide that “Europe will pay.”
Kapustāns noted that negotiations increasingly emphasise that Ukraine should abandon its NATO aspirations, while leaving open the possibility of EU membership. He stressed that decisions on Ukraine’s accession to the EU are not made by the US but by EU institutions, including the European Parliament, as well as each individual member state. He added that the US could exert influence over certain EU countries, including Hungary, which has previously attempted to block Ukraine’s progress toward EU membership, and predicted such attempts may continue.
According to Kapustāns,
EU enlargement is governed by the Copenhagen criteria.
He noted that the US “trump card”—as Trump himself might say—lies in its influence over several EU member states, including its good relations with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, as well as its influence in Poland and the Baltic states.
At the same time, Kapustāns stressed that Germany and France hold significant sway in EU decision-making. He observed that France has at various times cooperated with and competed against the US, and argued that France and other EU founding states would not easily accept a scenario in which the US announces Ukraine’s EU accession and it happens automatically.
The expert also pointed out that there are groups within the EU that do not want Ukraine to join the bloc, and expressed scepticism that Ukraine could be admitted in the coming years. He underlined that the accession process is slow, lengthy, and complex, highlighting Ukraine’s large agricultural sector. Admitting Ukraine would require a substantial redirection of EU funds toward Ukrainian farmers.
Kapustāns recalled that
the EU made concessions by rapidly granting Ukraine candidate status,
but pointed to Turkey as an example of a country that has held candidate status for years without achieving significant progress toward membership. He added that Ukraine’s case also involves corruption concerns, noting reports of possible misuse of aid and enrichment of elites, while stressing that such claims cannot be proven with absolute certainty.
Regarding Russia–EU relations, Kapustāns said Russia currently views the EU very negatively due to the extensive sanctions imposed against it. He noted that he has seen no indications that the EU is prepared to lift sanctions in the near future, even if the US were to propose rapidly removing American sanctions during negotiations.
He also mentioned EU restrictions on air traffic, including the closure of EU airspace to Russian aircraft, as well as other limitations. Kapustāns referred to the Belarusian regime’s instrumentalisation of irregular migration following falsified elections, stressing that the EU possesses strong tools to complicate Russia’s position.
Kapustāns observed that
trade between the US and Russia was minimal even before the war,
whereas the EU, due to geographical proximity, was in a different position. While some data indicate that trade continues, many sectors have ceased direct cooperation, and sanctions remain powerful economic levers. He does not believe relations with Russia can be quickly restored, noting that the Baltic states, Poland, and the Nordic countries would be reluctant to return to the previous model.
Looking ahead to next year, Kapustāns said Russia will undoubtedly continue and intensify hybrid attacks, as it is unable to wage an open war against the EU. He stressed that warnings about the need to prepare over the next five years should be seen as calls to develop combat capabilities and strengthen defence.
The expert concluded that regionally, the Baltic states, Poland, Finland, Sweden, and other Nordic countries could emerge as a significant force if they are able to unite. Among Europe’s major powers, he highlighted Germany’s growing military capabilities, citing the formation of a German brigade in Lithuania as a concrete example.
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