The Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) has published an analytical assessment of Russia’s nuclear policy. BNN offers a look at this report.
Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine there this country’s nuclear arms rhetoric has been in the focus of the public. SAB believes Russia’s nuclear rhetoric is mainly used as a tool to exact influence on the West and Ukraine in order to have them cave in to Russia’s demands, including putting an end to supporting Ukraine.
Kremlin has used nuclear rhetoric for this purpose in the past and
the moment Ukraine started gaining victories on the battlefield, it gave them a reason to double down.
However, SAB believes the possibility of Russia using nuclear arms is minimal.
Factors that promote nuclear rhetoric
SAB reports that Russia periodically increases nuclear rhetoric whenever the military situation in Ukraine becomes intense, when the situation does not go in Russia’s way or when decisions unfavourable to this country are made. Shortly after the start of the invasion in February 2022 Russia’s President Vladimir Putin publicly announced putting the country’s nuclear forces on high alert.
Although this caused a public resonance, there were no indicators of Russian forces involved in supervision over nuclear arms performing any activities outside of standard procedures and routine operations. Most of the changes were associated with expansion of personnel in units on combat duty. Similarly to other cases, the purpose of that announcement was to intimidate the West and demonstrate Russia’s position of power, especially in a situation when Russia’s armed forces are unable to secure success on the battlefield in Ukraine.
Similarly Russia’s recent announcement to deploy nuclear arms in Belarus is mainly a political signal. Russia already has systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads in Kaliningrad – Iskander close-range ballistic missile systems, combat aircraft and supersonic ballistic missiles Kinzhal.
This means this is primarily a political, not tactically military move. It is a response to Western nation’s policy towards Russia, as well as a response to Sweden and Finland joining NATO. Since 2022 Russian officials have been making comments about situating nuclear arms in Belarus if Sweden and Finland decide to join NATO. At the same time, the decision to deploy Russian nuclear arms outside its territory is a signal of Belarus becoming more deeply involved in Russia’s sphere of influence.
One other goal behind this aggressive nuclear rhetoric is to force Ukraine to cave in to demands and deter them from counter-attacking Russia’s annexed territories. But Russia likely knows this does not work – as we can see from Ukraine’s counter-offensive in summer 2022, when Ukraine took back the city of Kherson.
Russia will continue its nuclear blackmail tactic in the future. SAB sees it as a sign of desperation in light of numerous failures. The nuclear rhetoric will escalate if Ukraine succeeds in its counter-offensive.
Conditions that promote the possibility of nuclear arms being used
However, Russia could still decide to use nuclear arms. The military doctrine of the Russian Federation (latest redaction approved in 2021) and the order issued by the president in 2020 dictate the principles and guidelines for possible use of nuclear arms in different scenarios. These documents dictate Russia’s military doctrine in regards to nuclear arms.
First of all, a response nuclear strike would happen if an enemy uses nuclear arms or other weapons of mass destruction against Russia or any of its allies.
Secondly, nuclear arms can be used as a response to a missile attack on the Russian Federation, as well as conventional attacks that may prevent Russia from using its nuclear arsenal and pose existential threats.
Thirdly, Russia may use nuclear arms in response to a conventional attack or war that could put at risk the country’s existence.
According to SAB, scenarios in accordance with which Russia may decide to use nuclear arms include risks to Putin’s regime or of any “red lines” are breached. According to SAB, one such red line is Ukraine’s counter-offensive to retake Crimea.
Strategic deterrence and escalation management
Russia’s deterrence concepts for conventional and nuclear capabilities are considered mutually complementary elements. Strategic deterrence from Russia’s perspective is a comprehensive term that covers integrated non-military and military measures to influence opponents’ decision-making. This is why Russia’s military strategy does not consider use of nuclear arms as a final measure. It can be used to accomplish specific strategic and operational objectives.
As for the use of nuclear arms, Russia’s escalation management can be divided into three phases: demonstration of power, use of adequate power and use of full range of power.
Use of nuclear arms – how and why?
The decision to use nuclear arms requires very specific procedures. The Russian president has the right to decide on the use of nuclear arms. In parallel to that, however, such a decision also requires verification from the Russian Minister of Defence and Chief of the General Headquarters. Once the order for the nuclear strike is done, it is necessary to go through several levels of decision-making, during which officials specify and verify the objective of the order. Additionally, use of nuclear arms also involves a large number of manual actions. This means the human factor plays an important role in all of this.
It is not possible to completely exclude the possibility of Russia deciding to use nuclear arms, including demonstratively, to intimidate the West and deter countries from providing further support, as well as force Ukraine to sit down to negotiate and break their will to resist.
Also read: Russia shells Ukrainian cities