With Kremlin upping the aggression towards western countries, the possibility of Russian special services executing destructive operations in the cyber space of NATO and EU member states, which would make operations of public sectors difficult or create damage critical infrastructure, says Latvian Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB).
The risk of such cyber attacks is especially up now that Kremlin is dedicated to its war in Ukraine. On Monday, 21 March, SAB published the unclassified portion of its last year’s operations. The report was prepared before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
SAB press-statement on the report also includes the context of recent events. It also includes a citation of SAB director Egils Zviedris, who said Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marks new challenges for Europe’s security architecture.
While in the western society there is a drive towards influencing the future, Russia is trying to return to the past, notes SAB. The policy employed by Vladimir Putin’s regime more and more resembles the Soviet Union, which, in spite of certain problems, is the ideal for consolidation of power, societal control and geopolitical position, according to Russian political elite, said Zviedris.
This position puts Russia in confrontation with the west using the means available to the country, where security and reconnaissance services play a leading role, says SAB director.
The report mentions that Russian special services continue executing aggressive operations against the west and Latvia. Russian institutions and special services perform joint actions to discredit Latvia using a wide range of measures and technologies. Russian special services also form special units for sabotage and assassinations in foreign countries.
The report mentions that special services of countries outside NATO and the EU continued their operations against Latvia in 2021. SAB, of course, took measures to counter their activities. The threats coming from them ranges between moderate to major, depending on the country involved in the political region and western countries in general. Such operations were the most active from Russian special services.
SAB explains that the main objective of Russian special services is acquisition of reconnaissance information, create tools of influence and execute operations of influence to ensure the political objectives of Kremlin are met.
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SAB warns that, considering the restrictions put in place for the pandemic and travel, as well as reformation of the methods employed by foreign services, contacts are often made in the virtual space. A person or enterprise can receive specially-developed offers on social networks from a seemingly real, but fictive person or company online.
This way, for instance, some Latvian NGO received an e-mail containing an offer to perform regular monitoring of Latvia’s domestic political development, promising money in exchange. SAB urges people to not participate in dubious activities. To avoid pro-Kremlin information, SAB recommends carefully analysing information that describe the current developments in Ukraine.
The report also mentions that Russia’s influence in foreign country is part of a complex cooperation between different Russian institutions, where special services play the leading role.
SAB explains that the political and economic situation in countries the closest to Russia’s borders continues in an active manner. There is also the problem of Russian propaganda and campaigns aimed at discrediting different countries, as well as the spread of pro-Kremlin propaganda, promotion of «Russian world» and its values, creation of networks of agents and coordination of activities by Russian diaspora. These processes are especially dangerous in the context of Russian-Ukrainian war.
SAB stresses that Russian propaganda is able to quickly adapt to different development and topics used to discredit western countries. This way, propaganda activities aimed at destabilising and polarizing western societies included the topic of vaccines.
Russia initiated its propaganda activities to present Russia as a responsible and caring superpower that has the will and ability to resolve global crises. Kremlin officials actively reported in the past that Sputnik V would be supplied to more countries around the world, and Russian propaganda channels praised the invention as the world’s most accessible vaccine.
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However, while Russia continued publicly affirming plans to supply Sputnik V, information acquired by SAB indicates – Kremlin officials were aware as early as summer 2021 that it will not be possible due to limited production output.
SAB notes that one of the tools Kremlin employs to ensure hidden influence is organisations and enterprises financed by Russian oligarchs.
Yevgeni Prigozhin is mentioned as one of the coordinators of this network of agents. He built his business by providing services to Russian state structures.
Prigozhin received international attention as the owner of the so-called troll farm (Internet Research Agency) and Wagner private military company. One of the organisations of Progozhin’s network Admis Consultancy Ltd. had plans execute activities in the Baltic Sea region, Latvia included.
Thanks to public attention, this organisation’s operations have been shut down.
Latvian politicians, officials and opinion leaders remain the target audience of these organisations, SAB warns.
The report mentions that enhancement of cyber security is important on both an institutional and national level.
Analysis of Russia’s domestic policy shows that the legitimacy of Vladimir Putin’s regime relies more and more on falsifications and lies, whereas the stability of domestic policy relies on growing repressions.
The regime considers free spread of information a threat to its existence. Use of this approach demonstrates that Kremlin’s rhetoric and activities of its power structures, as well as the spread of pro-Kremlin statements in the context of the war in Ukraine.
The unclassified portion of SAB’s report will be reviewed by the Cabinet of Ministers and Saeima’s National Security Committee.
On 24 February Russian armed forces invaded Ukraine.