What is the current situation in efforts to curb illegal migration? Are new, physically strong men from third countries still trying to cross Latvia’s border from the Belarusian side? How successfully are we combating the smuggling of cigarettes, other tobacco products and drugs? How is recruitment going in the police, the State Fire and Rescue Service and the Border Guard? What are the priorities and biggest challenges for institutions under the Ministry of the Interior this year? BNN discussed these and other issues with Interior Minister Rihards Kozlovskis (New Unity).
This year’s cold winter not only emptied residents’ wallets with high heating and electricity bills, it also had one positive effect. During the winter months, pressure from illegal migration at the border decreased. What is the situation with illegal migration now?
Compared with last year, things are calmer, but there is no reason to think that anything fundamental has changed. This winter really has been extremely harsh by the standards of recent years, and if we look more broadly, the same has been true in other countries, for example Poland. However, in recent days violators have started appearing again at the Polish border. That means we must be ready, and we are ready, for illegal border crossings to resume.
You have said that the profile of border violators has changed significantly and that they are now young men in their prime. What kind of “war refugees” are these, where do they come from, and what might their goals in Latvia be?
Many citizens of these countries have been trying for years, even decades, to reach the European Union. Perhaps initially, in 2015, when the situation in Syria and other countries in that region really did involve danger to life, they were fleeing war. But later it became clear that the main motivation was the desire to find a better place to live and better economic opportunities. That is now the primary driver. Still, whereas two or three years ago there was no marked predominance of young, strong men among illegal border crossers, now there clearly is. Last year this became very apparent. Overall, the number of such attempts was very high. Last year the State Border Guard prevented 12,000 cases, meaning 12,000 people tried to enter our country illegally. That is the reality.
If these people do manage to enter the country, is there reason to be concerned about internal security threats? However you look at it, there are significant differences in culture, values and customs.
There is definitely a risk, because among these potential seekers of a better life there may also be people with other intentions. If we remember earlier times, for example in France in 2015, there was a clear surge in terrorism. Looking at this from Latvia’s perspective, I think the goal of the majority of these people is not to stay in our country. Historically, their aim has been to reach Germany or France, because communities from their home countries have been established there over a long period.
If we are acting as the buffer zone preventing this illegal migrant flow from reaching other EU countries, could we not also achieve Latvia’s exclusion from the EU Migration Pact, as Poland did?
No EU member state obtained any special exception — that is a myth. The criteria by which the European Commission ranked member states when assessing migration pressure are based on EU regulations, where those indicators are set out very clearly, even mathematically. The fact that Poland, like Latvia, has proportionally prevented one of the highest numbers of illegal migrants was not counted as a criterion, and therefore migration pressure in Latvia and Poland was assessed differently. In reality, the European Commission focused mainly on two indicators: the number of Ukrainian civilians taken in — and in Poland’s case this is about one million — and the high number of asylum applications.
From Latvia’s point of view, we have always pursued a conservative policy and sought to keep asylum application numbers as low as possible. If we had pursued a different approach, then those 12,000 people who tried to cross Latvia’s border illegally last year would have submitted asylum applications, and I am convinced that as a state we simply would not have been able to provide shelter to such a large number. The costs and the pressure would have been disproportionate.
This issue of deterring illegal border crossings is not included when countries are ranked under the Migration Pact. At the same time, the European Commission recognizes that Latvia’s contribution to guarding the EU’s eastern border is very significant, and Latvia has therefore received 140 million euros from the Commission for border strengthening. A much smaller amount had initially been planned; we managed to secure an additional 100 million euros.
So how exactly will it work — will we have to take in a certain number of migrants relocated from another member state, provide financial support to those states, or has it been decided that our contribution will be alternative measures?
The solidarity mechanism has evolved over the years. Initially, in 2015, it was essentially only about reception, and there were just two forms — relocation and resettlement. Now there are three ways in which EU member states can participate in the solidarity mechanism: physical relocation of people, a financial contribution, and third, alternative measures, such as expert assistance and other material or technical support. I want to stress once again that Latvia will not accept migrants under the solidarity mechanism. Latvia has consistently opposed compulsory mechanisms, and in this case it cannot in any way turn into relocation.
By agreement with the member states that will receive support, we plan this year to implement alternative measures. Of course, expert work and material-technical support also involve costs, but that is the form of support we are choosing. Let me underline again: the relocation of persons is not on our agenda; only alternative support measures are. The total cost of these could be a little over one million euros. But I want to remind you again that Latvia has received 140 million euros for strengthening the eastern border, and those funds were awarded in recognition of Latvia’s constant work in combating illegal border crossings, which in essence are an element of hybrid warfare. That is why the EU Migration Pact and its implementation must not be viewed narrowly; it should be assessed in terms of the broader gains for our country’s security.
The fence on Latvia’s border with Russia has essentially been completed. Does that also include the hard-to-reach areas?
The fence along the entire eastern border has been fully built. Those hard-to-reach areas relate to patrol paths and places in marshes and waters. From a threat perspective they are not the most decisive, but of course construction work is continuing there. It is a very small remaining percentage compared with the fact that we have already built a barrier along slightly more than 400 kilometres of border. In essence, the physical construction of the fence has practically been completed, and now the most important task is equipping the border with modern surveillance technologies — the so-called smart border.
You say illegal migrants are not getting in, but then who are these dark-skinned young men we are increasingly seeing in our cities?
No EU member state has a situation where absolutely nobody gets in. For example, in Poland, even though they have a built border, border guards, and very significant military support, around four to five percent of illegal migrants still manage to cross and enter the country. The same is true for us — up to about five percent, with the support of aggressive neighbouring regimes and organized crime, still manage to get here.
Overall, the number of third-country nationals in Latvia is increasing, but this is not linked to illegal entry. As I said, the goal of those who cross the border illegally is not to stay in Latvia; mainly they are trying to get to Germany or other European countries. Of course, the internal borders of Germany and Poland are an additional filter. At the same time, the increase in students and in relatively low-skilled labour from third countries is a reality.
Is there any way to control whether third-country nationals invited here by an employer really leave Latvia when their contracts end?
Of course, checks and raids are carried out. Politically, too, a clear course has been set. For several years we have been conducting such inspections, and last year more than 5,000 people were checked in total, of whom fewer than ten were in Latvia illegally. So the proportion is tiny. The broader issue is probably the overall policy on Latvia’s higher education export model. The Ministry of the Interior has prepared a report, which the government reviewed, and each sector now has to prepare proposals for improving the system. In my view, the largest number of third-country nationals from more distant countries comes specifically through studies, and unfortunately, as we see, they are not necessarily students of the highest added value who come to Latvia. We are working with universities and the Ministry of Education to establish criteria so that studies cannot simply be used as a way to enter our country and then, instead of studying, do low-skilled jobs. There is a separate, strict system for that, tied to official work permits. So this is also a question of how to track whether people really leave the country when their employment contracts expire, and all of this is being improved. I very much hope that before the spring session break we will be able to pass the necessary legislative amendments in parliament to strengthen this control.
Part of the public worries that third-country nationals may come, take some job, and then begin inviting family members, leading to a situation like in Germany, the UK or France, where large migrant populations create problems.
In this issue we are pursuing a very consistent and conservative policy, especially from the Ministry of the Interior’s side. Of course, employers also play a role, because the need for lower-skilled labour is a problem they themselves emphasize. At the same time, we want to create a system where we can be close to one hundred percent certain that no security risks will arise, because I, as interior minister, look at this primarily through the security prism. With the policy we have pursued, we are quite far — even very far — from those member states that followed an open policy. If we look, for example, at Sweden, there really are serious security risks there now.
But the concerns you mention do exist, and we follow very carefully the trends related to crime statistics. Overall, the group of third-country nationals whom we might potentially see as a security concern currently commits a very small proportion of crimes compared with those groups that have historically already been here.
Another threat, though not related to migration, is the smuggling of cigarettes, tobacco products and drugs. How successfully can the police detect and prevent these goods from reaching the market? Could Latvia’s skies also begin to see weather balloons carrying cigarette cargoes, as in Lithuania?
The use of meteorological balloons is basically directed at Lithuania. Latvia is not their target country, but yes, because of geography those balloons also enter our territory, even though in reality they are meant for Lithuania. Last year they entered our neighbour’s airspace in truly massive numbers. For security reasons, this even disrupted operations at Vilnius Airport.
If we assess the situation in Latvia, then from our point of view the greatest threat is, for example, the contraband of cigarettes or the circulation of illegal cigarettes. But we are taking action, and within just a couple of weeks we have detained persons who were trying to receive such a balloon delivery in Latvia as well. We have detained both Lithuanian citizens and, unfortunately, Latvian citizens too — eight persons in total — so we do know how to fight this phenomenon. Speaking about cigarettes, it must be acknowledged that illegal factories are not the only source; a significant share also comes through smuggling, which is why these balloons are now appearing. As we know, the border has been greatly strengthened in recent years and cross-border movement restricted, and therefore offenders are looking for new ways to move contraband. But these balloons are not the answer. In my view, during the past year we have carried out many detentions and shut down illegal production sites. The State Police, in cooperation with the State Border Guard, have seized 512 million illegal cigarettes in total.
Surely the whole country could not smoke that many?
I don’t think Latvia could; the consequences would probably be very sad. These cigarettes, because of price differences, are intended for other markets in the European Union. For example, in Scandinavia prices for tobacco products are much higher. So it is clear that the target here is not the Latvian market, but those European markets where the price — and therefore criminals’ potential profit — is much greater.
Experience shows that as soon as excise taxes rise or restrictions are introduced — as happened recently with electronic cigarettes and nicotine pouches — illegal Telegram channels immediately emerge and illegal online sales flourish. Is it even possible to cut the head off that hydra?
Every prohibition and restriction that is introduced primarily places an additional burden and challenge on our law-enforcement agencies. These distribution channels through platforms such as Telegram, which allow discreet activity, complicate the work of our services, but it is not as if we are unable to fight it. It is very difficult, because gaining access requires a great deal of operational work and access to the necessary information is complicated. Still, last year about 150,000 illegal electronic cigarettes were seized. Given our resources and the scale of the problem, we must also keep our focus on illegal drug trafficking, which is important from the standpoint of danger.
You mentioned resources, and that naturally raises the question of staffing in the State Police, Border Guard and State Fire and Rescue Service. How is motivation to work in these very responsible services?
From a personnel policy perspective, I can actually be proud, because last year was the first in a very long time when the State Police recruited more staff than left the service. If in 2024 we were down by 200 employees, then last year we were up by 73. The State Fire and Rescue Service also had a positive year, because we recruited more employees than we lost — 170 additional staff joined. I cannot give an exact number for the Border Guard, but there too we have growth. I think this is partly the result of the government’s and parliament’s decision to increase remuneration, which marked the start of a significant pay rise for employees in the internal affairs sector, along with other measures that are being implemented. For example, the new disaster management centres, which alongside firefighters also enable the presence of other emergency services such as the State Police and emergency medical services. In Riga last year we also opened two new police stations — on Mūkusalas Street and E. Birznieka-Upīša Street — which are modern and absolutely unlike the conditions in which police officers had previously worked. In recent years we have also fully replaced the State Fire and Rescue Service’s vehicles with new ones. All these measures make staying in service more attractive. Student intake at the State Police College has also grown significantly — last year more than 200 students were admitted, more than double the usual figure of around 90.
The growth in staff numbers in the interior system is genuinely good news, but that immediately raises the question of funding. Is this year’s budget sufficient, and can you say that there is enough money in the Ministry of the Interior’s area of responsibility?
I do not know any minister who would say there is enough money. Of course, there are things for which we still need additional funding. We must continue building infrastructure, because although we are moving quite quickly with the disaster management centres, they still do not yet cover the whole country. State Police stations are also an area where additional funding would be needed. I also keep a close eye on remuneration. We must not think that because we addressed some problems in one year, everything is solved. Yes, it was a good step, but it does not mean that for the next five years we can do nothing.
Unfortunately, the geopolitical reality is that by far the largest share of state budget funding is going toward strengthening defence capacity and meeting NATO requirements, and here we must try to keep a balance so that we can also finance internal security adequately. In some respects we do receive support from the defence sector itself — the new border, the new uniforms — our border guards have these thanks to military support. We are also looking at solutions for re-equipping services so there can be common standards and systems, allowing us to use such funding not only for defence in the narrow sense but also for internal security. Because all these hybrid warfare elements must primarily be addressed at the internal security level.
Back in 2023 the Traffic Police were dissolved, and increasingly it feels as if many drivers now behave on the road however they please. Even a red traffic light no longer stops many of them. Perhaps it would be worth restoring that separate unit?
I understand these concerns, but I believe that as technology develops, this is precisely one of the ways to improve control in road traffic and in combating crime and offences more generally. Many countries implement this basic control through technological solutions, and we must continue working in that direction.
The Traffic Police as a separate structural unit were not abolished because we had too few police officers or too few potential recruits. Before that, there was a fairly extensive evaluation, carried out with support from an EU-funded project involving foreign experts. The use of technology, in my view, allows us to use our police officers more rationally. Our mobile stations — police vans fully equipped with IT and computer systems — make it possible to resolve issues on the spot rather than always going back to a station. Intersections are also gradually being equipped with technology that automatically records offences, especially running red lights. The driver then receives a penalty notice, just as with speed cameras. There is also aggressive driving, which must be tackled, but one of the solutions the State Police have introduced is the use of drones, and this will be further developed. Re-establishing a separate Traffic Police unit would not solve these problems. If we look at the statistics, in the period when there were many traffic police officers on the roads, significantly more people died in traffic accidents than now. We will never be able to place a police officer on every road and say: everything is fine, because we have enough traffic police.
Although spring is already well underway, let me still ask: what are the main priorities and challenges for institutions under the Ministry of the Interior in 2026?
Without question, it is the difficult geopolitical situation. Nothing suggests that this will change in the near future. That means the security of the state’s eastern border, hybrid threats and sabotage acts remain central. The State Security Service has already set out quite precisely in its public annual report what was done last year and what risks it sees ahead. So there will be no relaxation here. Unfortunately, our eastern neighbour is doing everything to make our lives more difficult and to threaten our national security. That is the major challenge.
Then there are all the criminal offences that continue to occur, including violence against minors and within families. Unfortunately, these numbers are not decreasing, but in a sense this is also linked to the fact that much more information about such cases is now reaching law-enforcement agencies; previously they were highly latent. If we care about our already not very large nation, then in my view this is extremely important. The illegal circulation of excise goods will also remain on the agenda.
The range of issues is broad enough, but the primary challenge is geopolitical security, because we must protect the state as a whole and our national security, so that we do not face a situation where we feel threatened not only by everyday misfortunes and crimes, but also by pressure imposed from outside. Overall, that is the direction in which we must work, and we must definitely continue strengthening the capacity of our security services. Their contribution is fundamental and very important, both in analytical capability and in preventive action. We have managed to maintain security at a level where our crime situation is not like that in Scandinavia, in Sweden, where armed gangs settle scores and shootings occur quite regularly. There are, of course, risks, but I believe we live in a safe country, and we work every day to keep it that way.
Read also: BNN IN FOCUS | Migration, security and sovereignty: Filips Rajevskis on what Latvia should not repeat