Ilona Bērziņa/Opinion piece
During the Cold War there were hundreds of bomb shelters built in Latvia for the Soviet nomenclature in the event of a nuclear war. When the status of civil protection objects was lifted from them in 2008, they were quickly privatised, remade into warehouses, adapted to other needs or simply taken over. Now that the issue of shelters has become a hot topic once again due to the geopolitical situation, there are no bunkers at all, and there won’t be in the foreseeable future.
The last large bomb shelter or Secret facility Nr.100, which was located under Riga Central Railway Station, was sacrificed four years ago in the name of Rail Baltica. The Ministry of Transport bought it from Latvian Railway for EUR 18 500. It is estimated that construction of new bomb shelters or restoration of existing bunkers will not be a cheap undertaking, but the most important factor in all this is political will and commitment to resolving these issues. The topic of bomb shelters is not the only challenge in all this.
Solution to the years-long “cell broadcast” issue
Latvia has two unpredictable and aggressive countries neighbouring it – Russia and Belarus. The two countries are ruled by authoritarian regimes that put at risk regional and international security. This is why it is necessary to adopt an early warning system as soon as possible so that it is possible to keep residents informed about military and other threats using “cell broadcast” method. Lithuania adopted this system ten years ago. Text message solutions are available in Estonia, Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Britain*. Latvia, on the other hand, is still doing studies and going through reports on this system’s adoption.
Let’s hope the “Early warning system creation and maintenance for four years” procurement project turns out successful, so that Latvia has a fully functional system as early as next year. Otherwise Latvia will have made itself to be a country of non-sighted incapable people to whom bureaucracy is closer than the safety of the inhabitants of their country. Right now the main warning system used to keep residents informed of any disasters is the network of 164 sirens installed across Latvia.
Both the beating around the bush with the cell broadcast solution and the topic of non-existent bomb shelters indicate that the area of civil protection in Latvia is deeply flawed. Annex 33 to the State Civil Protection Plan – “Disaster management measures in case of war, military invasion or threat thereof” describes what should be developed, carried out, identified or organized, but we must agree with the opinion of the State Audit Office on this topic – there are many who participate in this system, but there isn’t a person that carries any specific responsibility.
Civil protection specialists – number one priority
The municipal administration plays a major role in any crisis situation – whether it’s a flood, earthquake or military threat. It should be mentioned that in the event of a military threat the responsibility of local governments first appeared in Civil Protection Plans at the beginning of the year. Municipalities responded to it by saying that it is important to improve cooperation between the state and municipalities, as well as introduce civil protection training and adopt a single crisis management system. Currently it’s unclear if these suggestions are taken seriously.
Trained civil protection specialists are in high demand in this situation. No plan, no matter how well-written, has any worth without people who can coordinate and implement it quickly and accurately. Even if everyone runs out of their home with a 72-hour relief package on their shoulders, without a plan it won’t mean a thing.
The Ministry of Defence did release an informative pamphlet “72 hours”, detailing what residents should do in a crisis situation, but is this information comprehensible for every old lady in Bauska and every old man in Rezekne? But did all municipalities include in their respective plans information on what residents should if, God forbid, hour X actually arrives? Right now it seems neither the state nor municipalities have gone further than flapping their gums and writing papers (Civil Protection Plans can be viewed on the website of Latvian Fire and Rescue Service).
Neighbours have bomb shelters, but in Latvia this issue rocks in place
One of the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine is that bomb shelter are needed at least in the largest cities. Latvia has no excuse in this situation. Since the start of the year Estonia has restored 103 public bomb shelters. All of them can host approximately 60 000 people. There was talk that by 2024 Estonia plans to expand these shelters so that they can take in 730 000 residents. A map of bomb shelters is available in Poland as well. This country has 1 903 bomb shelters, 8 719 shelters and 224 113 emergency shelters, which include cellars, garages, buildings of municipal institution and churches.
When it comes to churches, Lithuania’s example becomes more interesting. In this country the Catholic church and the Ministry of the Interior have signed a cooperation agreement. It is planned for priests to educate their congregation about aspects of civil protection. Some churches will be used as shelters for emergency situations. Latvia has yet to adopt such “high values”. This topic has not been discussed with church representatives, at least so far. And this is not as much about cellars as it is about priests helping explain to the congregation various important aspects of civil protection.
Nevertheless, despite cooperation with the Catholic church, Lithuania is not having an easy time with establishing bomb shelters. According to Lithuanian Seimas Social Democratic Faction, National Defence and Security Committee member Dovile Šakaliene, Sweden, which is far away from the possible front line, is more serious about bomb shelters than Lithuania. “Swedes have 65 000 bomb shelters capable to taking in mire than 70% of their population. Our government has yet to commence even practical discussions of this topic”. Lithuanian Minister of the Interior Agne Bolitaite doesn’t even hide the fact that the next government will have to tackle this problem, because “we need billions” and political parties will have to reach an agreement.
Still no “shelter construction regulations”
However, while Lithuanians make it clear that the main problem on the path to the installation of shelters is money, Latvians are too busy playing their favourite sport – running from bureaucratic office to bureaucratic office. The problem is that we still don’t have any clear requirements as to what these requirements should include. LTV De Factor programme reported recently – the Ministry of Economy, following Finland’s experience (there are 9 000 shelters available for residents of Helsinki), has successfully developed new construction requirements, but this document is not yet approved. This is because the Ministry of the Interior is also working on its own shelter development plan at the same time. Until it’s finished, construction requirements are on hold as well. Another obstacle is the complaints from real estate developers, who are not enthusiastic about installing bomb shelters in new projects. The argument seems logical – it makes building construction and, consecutively, the apartments in it more expensive.
Neither the government nor municipalities are not happy about the prospect of spending large amounts of money and human resources on the creation of bomb shelters. However, this is our modern reality. It’s also worth mentioning that bomb shelters and sanctuaries are not synonymous – while the first is used to protect people from bombs, the other is mainly used to provide residents with aid and from where it is possible to quickly evacuate people.
It is great that Riga City Protection Office has found 355 locations perfect for bomb shelters. However, a lot of time will likely pass until progress is made there. Bureaucracy, procurements, tenders and mutual disputes will accompany the procedure of finding funding and human resources.
Why should municipal leaders have access to official secrets?
In any event, the lion’s share of responsibility for civil protection rests directly with the municipalities, so it is important who is at the helm of solving and coordinating these issues. This is why the proposal from President Edgars Rinkēvičs to make it mandatory for top municipal officials to receive access to official secrets is so important. While the main focus of the municipal civil protection plans was mainly on natural or technogenic disasters, it was possible to make do without them, but since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, nothing is what it used to be.
I don’t think that civil protection in the event of a military threat could be coordinated, for example, by a municipal official who, in the context of the Russian war in Ukraine, would suggest “siting down at the negotiating table with Putin” or such local leaders who do not hide their sympathy with the Russian and Belarusian regimes at all. Some municipalities are already sceptical about this suggestion and call it “political games with municipalities” with the objective being “to push out strong municipal leaders from their seats”.
This is where I would like to remind that Section 9 of the Law on Official Secret makes it clear in which cases access could be refused, and if a person does not qualify to receive access to official secrets, he or she definitely should not be put in charge of leading posts in municipal administrations. This is why the argument from Latvian Association of Large Cities that this requirement will be “an instrument of a group of parties or politicians in power to remove elected officials from office”, is a flimsy argument. It will be interesting to observe what members of the parliament could say from the tribune when discussing the president’s legislative initiative. It will also be interesting to watch if the bomb shelter ball ends up in the bureaucratic swamp, or if Latvia manages to pull itself together and follow Estonia’s example.
*Data from Ministry of the Interior’s 2020 report “On the cell broadcast system and other possible notification systems, their implementation and maintenance costs”.
BNN IN FOCUS | In a crisis people will have to look for shelter on their own – bomb shelters hostages of bureaucracy
