Anatomy of propaganda: how Zapad 2025 exercises serve Russia’s and Belarus’s information war

During the Zapad 2025 military exercises held in September, Russia spread six key narratives — one emphasizing the military unity of Russia and Belarus, another portraying NATO as preparing for war under the guise of peace, and a third framing Ukraine as a source of regional instability threatening its neighbors, according to a joint investigation by the Baltic Center for Investigative Journalism Re:Baltica and Media IQ, a Belarusian journalists’ press club in exile.

By analyzing narratives disseminated in both countries, researchers found that Russia’s coverage of the Zapad 2025 drills revolved around six main messages.

First, the exercises were presented as a demonstration of allied strength — proof of the military unity and readiness of Russia and Belarus to act together in defense. According to Re:Baltica, this was the dominant narrative across all Russian media formats.

Second, the nuclear deterrence narrative portrayed Russia’s nuclear arsenal as a key defense tool. While outwardly defensive, it carried a thinly veiled threat under the language of “containment.”

Third, the NATO-as-aggressor theme claimed that the Alliance was “preparing for war while hiding behind peace.”

Fourth, Ukraine was depicted as the main provocateur — the source of regional instability endangering all its neighbors.

Fifth, the technological superiority narrative emphasized Russia’s supposed advantage over the West. It was used to compensate for the prolonged war in Ukraine, creating the illusion of sustained progress and power.

Finally, the “exercises as cover” message — the most subtle and perhaps the most effective narrative — suggested that Zapad 2025 could serve as a disguise for other operations. This message did not come directly from official Russian sources but amplified Ukraine’s fears, allowing Russia to manipulate the narrative indirectly.

In Belarus, researchers identified three main narratives.

The first — in diplomatic communication — was the “peaceful power” narrative. Official rhetoric emphasized that Zapad 2025 had purely defensive goals, with the central idea that peace can be achieved through strength. Belarus was portrayed as a responsible partner seeking to reduce tensions.

A distinctive feature was the appearance of openness — the invitation of observers and accreditation of foreign journalists, contrasting with supposed “Western secrecy” around their own military preparations.

The second narrative, aimed at the domestic audience, focused on the “invincible fortress.” It dominated Telegram channels and several military publications, highlighting military might and readiness to repel any aggressor.

A notable element was technical fetishism — detailed descriptions of weapons and military procedures

designed to create an illusion of technological superiority, the researchers note.

The third narrative, “Union solidarity,” was woven through all Belarusian media coverage. Re:Baltica points to an article by state agency BELTA titled: “Finally, as it should be: we are together. How the first joint Belarusian-Russian Zapad exercises took place.”

This narrative frequently invoked World War II symbolism. The military newspaper In the Name of the Motherland referred to Belarusian and Russian soldiers as heirs of the “generation of victors,” presenting their cooperation as a continuation of their ancestors’ fight against “Western threats.”

The alliance with Russia was framed as natural and inevitable in the face of external dangers. Russian soldiers were described only as “defensive partners” and “allies.” A key component of this narrative was the emphasis on shared threats and common goals, Re:Baltica noted.

Researchers emphasized that for Alexander Lukashenko’s regime,

the key outcome of Zapad 2025 was shaping public readiness for further militarization.

This was portrayed as a natural and necessary response to external threats.

Such changes were reflected in attitudes toward defense spending, military conscription, and the popularity of patriotic events.

While such topics had previously faced public resistance, after the information campaign surrounding Zapad 2025, they were increasingly accepted as an unavoidable price for national security, Re:Baltica reported.

This emerging “culture of readiness” is manifested through heightened public interest in military affairs, rising popularity of patriotic activities, and shifting attitudes among young people toward compulsory military service, the researchers highlighted.

Comparing the two countries’ narratives, researchers concluded that Belarusian state media sought to appear diplomatic, emphasizing “peacefulness” and “defense,” and avoiding direct references to specific target countries, while Russian outlets were far more aggressive.

The difference was particularly striking in their treatment of nuclear weapons. While Belarusian media referred to “deterrence” in veiled terms, Russian channels used a “warming-up” method — gradually conditioning the public to accept the potential use of nuclear arms, Re:Baltica noted.

In this information ecosystem, Belarusian and Russian official media played the “good cops”

— diplomatic, open, and peace-loving — while Russian Telegram channels acted as “bad cops,” saying the things that official outlets would not, the researchers concluded.

The study, conducted by Media IQ in cooperation with Re:Baltica, analyzed Belarusian state media and pro-government Telegram channels from July to late September 2025.

To identify narratives in Russia, researchers examined coverage of “Zapad 2025” in Russian media and Telegram channels from September 1 to 16, 2025, when the exercises were publicly reported to take place.

Officially, Zapad 2025 was announced to run from September 12 to 16, but in practice, related activities began as early as July, and the drills were expected to culminate with strategic nuclear exercises in October or November, according to the Military Intelligence and Security Service.

No significant incidents were recorded in Latvian territory during the exercises, but the Ministry of Defence will continue monitoring the situation, Defence Minister Andris Sprūds (Progressives) told LETA.

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