If the situation continues developing, we can expect the war may continue with varying intensity until spring next year, as reported by Latvian Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB).
On Tuesday, 13 September, SAB started publishing a series of analytical articles about different important topics. The first article is dedicated to the Russian-Ukrainian war and its consequences for Latvia.
If the current situation continues developing, there is a high possibility of the war continuing with varying intensity at the very least until spring of next year. Under current conditions Russian armed forces have a shortage of troops and combat capabilities to overcome resistance in Ukraine, which is further compounded by the attacks of Ukrainian armed forces on Russian logistical infrastructure, SAB reports.
Signals coming from Russia’s foreign policy indicate the country is not interested in ending the conflict.
If Russia’s foreign policy direction does not change, Russian aggression against Ukraine will continue and tension with the west will escalate even further.
An important condition for Ukraine’s continued defence against Russia and ability to take back occupied territories is continued supplies of western arms. One additional factor is the training of Ukrainian military outside the country. This will help provide more well-trained troops and increase the combat capabilities of the Ukrainian army, SAB continues.
The topic of arms supplies from western countries and the ability of western countries’ military industrial sector to balance aid for Ukraine and countries’ own demand is also an important factor.
Society’s political cohesion, which has been very high since the start of the Russian invasion, further strengthens Ukraine’s defensive capabilities and resistance.
Most Ukrainian citizens are united in the belief their country will repel the Russian invasion and will recover lost territories.
Unity is equally important in the topic regarding Ukraine’s EU and NATO course. The majority support it, which indicates that Ukraine’s society is clearly in favour of the country’s geopolitical orientation away from Russia. It is further increased by the mostly negative opinion about Russia and Belarus.
Changes in society’s political cohesion and beliefs are possible if the war continues for too long, intensity of the armed conflict going down, or if the socioeconomic situation in Ukraine deteriorates. In this situation Russia may take steps in the information space, for example, to undermine the unity of Ukrainians and reduce their support of the army, the government and its decisions.
The possibility of Russian President Vladimir Putin being replaced or toppled in the near future as a result of public protests or a coup by political elite is considered low.
In recent years and from 24 February onward Putin’s regime has systematically acted against political opposition through assassinations of opposition leaders and arrests of journalists and participants of events organised by the opposition.
Since February repressions from Putin’s regime have expanded, now covering political opposition and basically everyone who does not publicly support or criticises the rime and the invasion of Ukraine.
The factual monopoly of the state in the information space is also a factor that further limits the ability of Russian society to influence the regime. This monopoly over information and its availability allows the state to directly influence public opinions in relation to the political opposition, the situation in the country and developments around the world.
Together with laws limiting the freedom of speech and the court justice system that answers to the regime, Kremlin ensures the lack of critical opinions in the public information space.
Mass media controlled by the Russian state continues spreading reports in support of the regime, including the justification of the decision for Russia to commence the military invasion of Ukraine; painting the opposition of western countries against Russia as unjustified; outlining how poorly western sanctions have impacted Russia.
Kremlin’s media also position Putin’s regime as being able to guarantee the safety of Russia, its stability and welfare.
The Russian political elite is interested in preserving a status quo, because they depend on the regime and Putin’s good will, which provides them access to resources. Attempts to act against the regime means risking undermining your own position, welfare, and even life.
It is expected that in the coming months the effect of sanctions on Russia’s economy will increase. It is not possible to put a stop to this process entirely.
This means the economy will stagnate, which will affect the quality of life of Russian residents. High energy prices, as well as administrative regulations adopted by the Russian government can withstand pressure from sanctions in a short-term perspective. However, in the long-term sanctions will have an enormous effect on society and the country in general.
Although wide riots and dissatisfaction with rapid economic decline or political repressions are not expected, the regime will have to divert society’s attention away from their responsibility and instead blame everything on the U.S. and NATO. The topic of threats to Russia’s sovereignty may be mentioned as well.
SAB notes that the majority of people in Russia support the invasion of Ukraine and invite intensifying the attack.
Putin’s regime needs accomplishments in Ukraine to present to society as their victory. This is why voluntary withdrawal from Ukraine is not expected. This means Russia plans to add the occupied territories to its jurisdiction using a manipulated plebiscite.
Suffering further losses, Russia will insist more on the involvement of Belarus in the war. Use Belarusian territory to attack Ukraine, Aleksandr Lukashenko’s public support of the invasion and regular threats directed at Baltic States and other western countries indicate Lukashenko serves Putin’s will.
However, the possibility of Belarusian forces joining the war in Ukraine is considered low, because this could further increase the negative opinions of Lukashenko.
Russia will remain a source of military threat, and its has enough arms, munitions and other military equipment, as well as industrial ability to maintain them. However, due to shortage of technologies caused by sanctions, Russia may experience problems with production and modernisation of existing arms.
To compensate the lack of modern arms and the losses suffered in Ukraine, Russia may increase the role of nuclear arms in forming its public image or long-term blackmail.
As the conflict remains and tension remains high between Russia and the west, it is expected Russia will continue an aggressive foreign policy. The country may also employ ‘political war’ and hybrid instruments of war – turning against Ukraine and countries opposing Russia in international institutions, secretly supporting political groups that are friendly towards Russia, performing information operations and cyber attacks and using economic measures to influence political processes, create public unrest and turn people away from helping Ukraine.
The possibility of violent measures towards opponents of the regime in emigration is not excluded.
SAB concluded that if Russia’s foreign policy does not change, the tension between Russia and the west will remain high.
Russian aggression is based on geopolitical ambitions that are not compatible with the principles of international order that were put in place after the end of the Cold War.
With that it is expected political confrontation will continue as Russia looks for different tools of influence to accomplish a change in position of western countries. Russia is interested in using its economic influence and pressure in the information space to promote a more positive opinion of Russia in western countries. Additionally, Russia with try to support western political groups that stand in favour of restoring relations with the country.
Normalisation of relations with western countries is not expected specifically because of Russia’s own actions.
The European Union’s course towards developing its energy sector without Russia’s resources will continue in a long-term perspective, gradually weakening Russia’s positions on the market.
The market is expected to change orientation, forming a long-term plan to turn away from Russia. It is also expected the initiative in favour of using alternative energy resources and reducing Russia’s role on the market will be one of the objectives of Russian operations in hopes of slowing or halting this process in its entirety.
Confrontations are also expected in the military field, as Russia continues aggressive, provocative rhetoric with demonstration of strength with intimidation in mind. The war in Ukraine is expected to continue for some time, but the lack of combat capabilities of Russian armed forces and successful attacks by Ukrainian forces on supply lines will reduce their ability to secure victories.
Russia still has industrial capacity and stores of munitions and arms to continue fighting in Ukraine.
Russia may still declare mobilisation, which would allow its armed forces to receive massive reinforcements. Russian government’s unwillingness to declare mobilisation can be explained with Kremlin’s plans to avoid a counter-reaction from society. Instead, Kremlin uses promises of high wages. Ukraine, on the other hand, has to deal with relatively limited resources. On the other hand, there is support coming from the west.
Latvia needs will need to take into account four considerations in a long-term perspective.
First of all – strategic patience. Ukraine’s successes largely depend on supplies of arms from allied countries and training of its troops. This requires time for training and integration of aid in the army. Western countries need strategic patience as well in order to demonstrate to Russia their readiness and commitment to not step aside in the face of the aggressor. Russia’s aggressive foreign policy benefits from indecisiveness, which is unacceptable in this war.
The second consideration comes from this – the need to continue aiding Ukraine both in military and financial form.
Thirdly the war has already caused and will continue creating new economic challenges and reformations. Resolving them will require time and patience.
Fourthly, Russia will try to hide its military failures using political and information channels in western countries, including in Latvia, in order to undermine support for Ukraine and return to «pragmatic» relations with Russia. It is expected that Russia will try to circumvent channels of traditional influence and move to social networks and platforms that are still allowed to operate in Latvia, SAB predicted at the conclusion of the article.