Last year, representatives of various sectors, including politicians, took advantage of opportunities to travel on paid visits to China, and following such trips individuals often consciously—and in some cases unconsciously—became lobbyists for China’s interests, according to the State Security Service’s (VDD) annual report on its activities last year.
As in previous years, Latvia was not among the priority intelligence targets of Chinese intelligence services in 2025. At the same time, Chinese intelligence services maintained an interest in intelligence related to political developments, defence-related issues and the economic situation in Latvia, as well as Latvia’s activities within NATO and EU institutions and the agendas of these international organisations.
China’s greatest intelligence-gathering potential continued to be ensured by intelligence activities conducted from its own territory, with favourable conditions created by Latvian citizens’ travel to China and an uncritical attitude toward the threats posed by that country. By offering Latvian residents opportunities to participate in paid visits to China, Chinese institutions and organisations created favourable conditions for Chinese intelligence services to identify and recruit potential sources of information and lobbyists, the report states.
According to information obtained by the VDD, representatives of Latvia’s academic and scientific community, politicians, entrepreneurs and cultural sector representatives took advantage of paid trips to China last year. After such trips, individuals often consciously—and in some cases unconsciously—became lobbyists for China’s interests, calling for closer cooperation with China and disseminating official narratives of the Chinese Communist Party on issues of strategic importance to China.
Over the past year, China primarily used so-called “soft power” policies to build positions of influence in Latvia:
promoting Chinese culture, encouraging closer cooperation in the academic field, and in other ways seeking to create an image of itself as a trustworthy, peace-loving partner focused on cooperation for mutual benefit and development.
At the same time, in the VDD’s assessment, these Chinese activities are also associated with intelligence risks, as China’s regulatory framework stipulates an obligation for its companies and citizens to provide support to the Chinese state, including intelligence services, when necessary. This obligation also applies to Chinese companies registered in other countries, as well as to Chinese citizens living, working or studying abroad.
Thus, China employs a so-called “whole-of-society” approach to obtain information of interest to it, including scientific and economic intelligence.
In the service’s assessment,
China’s most significant influence continued to be present in Latvia’s academic and research environment.
China continued to use existing cooperation formats, such as the Confucius Institute network and cooperation agreements with Latvian higher education institutions, while also offering new ones.
Among other things, the VDD found that cooperation offers in the academic sphere were among the priorities during visits by Chinese delegations and the leadership of Confucius Institutes to certain Latvian municipalities.
Intelligence risks were also posed by the continued use of China-manufactured technologies at nationally significant facilities and institutions, as well as in companies working with sensitive data.
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