Russia-generated security risks to Europe and Latvia are significantly increasing, SAB concludes

Security risks posed by Russia in Europe are increasing significantly, the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) concludes in its 2025 activity report published on Monday. While emphasizing that Russia does not currently pose a direct military threat to Latvia, SAB notes that a number of indicators point to potential long-term plans.

SAB stresses that Russia’s objective is to weaken the West at both national and international levels. “In recent years, the perception of the West as an existential threat to the ruling regime has only intensified. Russia believes that it is already engaged in direct warfare with the West and that this struggle is taking place in Ukraine, globally, and ideologically. As Russia’s threat perception sharpens, security risks in Europe increase significantly,” the report states.

The security service underlines that, to implement its influence and plans, Russia continues to use and constantly adapt existing hybrid instruments while also developing new ones. One increasingly active tool is the use of legal mechanisms in the international arena aimed at internationally discrediting Latvia and, over the longer term, exerting international pressure to force Latvia to change its policy toward Russia.

Russia is paying particular attention to the United Nations. For example, over the past year and a half, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has periodically announced preparations to sue the Baltic states, including Latvia, as well as several other countries, at the International Court of Justice over alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking populations. According to SAB, the purpose of such lawsuits would be to discredit Latvia internationally and, over time, apply pressure on Latvia to alter its policy toward Russia and Russian-speaking residents.

In SAB’s assessment,

Russia will also continue to maintain a military threat to its neighboring countries and to NATO as a whole.

The militarization of its economy and the development of military capabilities will continue even after the war in Ukraine ends or is frozen.

SAB emphasizes that the information it has gathered indicates that Russia’s perception of Latvia is becoming increasingly similar to how it viewed Ukraine before the war began. At present, Russia does not pose a direct military threat to Latvia, but a number of signs point to potential long-term plans.

The bureau notes that the Kremlin leadership continues to operate with a distorted perception of threats, fueled by growing isolation of the elite and the absence of internal critical voices. Russia believes it is already at war with the West, fighting on military, global, and ideological fronts. This worldview increases the risk of miscalculations.

As Russia’s threat perception intensifies, security risks in Europe rise accordingly.

In 2025, Russia continued a broad spectrum of influence operations against Western countries, aiming to weaken Western unity in support of Ukraine and potentially to halt that support, while also preparing for possible confrontation with NATO.

Russia has continued not only sabotage and information operations against Western states but also cyberattacks. Russian hackers have demonstrated both the willingness and capability to carry out cyberattacks on industrial control systems in Latvia and other Western countries, potentially causing temporary disruptions and posing threats to critical infrastructure security. The goal of such attacks is to disrupt services, shock societies, sow doubt among populations, punish countries for supporting Ukraine, and deter future assistance, SAB warns.

Although since the beginning of 2025 discussions about possible peace talks between Russia and Ukraine have intensified, SAB’s information indicates that Russia is prepared to continue hostilities at least into 2026. Military tactics, the economy, and society are increasingly being adapted for prolonged warfare.

The current situation is characterized by intense fighting, with neither side achieving a decisive advantage.

Despite Russia’s superiority in military resources and troop numbers, Ukraine’s armed forces retain sufficient capacity to prevent a strategic breakthrough by Russian forces, SAB notes. Both sides have adapted their tactics, focusing more on exerting pressure and wearing down the opponent while minimizing their own losses. According to SAB, given these trends, the likelihood of strategic-level changes on the front line within the next six months is very low. It is therefore highly likely that Russia will attempt to achieve its maximum objectives regarding Ukraine through potential peace negotiations and international pressure, including efforts to reduce Western military support for Ukraine.

SAB also points out that Russia continues to focus its economy on militarization, maintaining stability and resilience against Western sanctions at the expense of long-term welfare development. Rapid resource reallocation and uneven support for different sectors are creating structural imbalances whose negative effects are likely to emerge in the future. While the probability of an economic collapse in the short term remains low, in the long term Russia’s technological development and international competitiveness will decline.

According to SAB, the militarization of Russia’s economy will continue even after the war in Ukraine ends or is frozen. If Western countries were to lift or ease sanctions following a potential end to the war, Russia’s ability to sustain high levels of militarization without severe economic shocks would increase significantly, the service warns.

SAB notes that

Russia reacts sharply even to minimal attempts by the Belarusian regime to pursue a more independent policy.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, economic cooperation between Belarus and Russia has become increasingly militarized, with Belarusian companies frequently reorienting their activities to produce goods for Russia’s military-industrial complex. In the event of a military conflict, Belarus’s civilian economy would fully serve Russia’s military interests, SAB assesses.

Latvia’s security service also highlights China’s growing political influence in Western countries and international institutions, using various forms of investment to create economic influence and dependency. Beijing employs “soft power” activities to shape a positive image in Western societies and increasingly seeks to exploit academic and scientific cooperation to access sensitive information, share knowledge and technologies without authorization, and build contacts aimed at achieving economic and military advantages.

SAB urges students, academics, and researchers to remain vigilant and carefully assess proposed cooperation projects and exchange opportunities to prevent the transfer of sensitive knowledge and technologies to other states.

SAB Director Egils Zviedris notes that last year the bureau assessed that,

under certain conditions, Russia’s military threat to NATO could significantly increase within about five years.

Recently, various experts have suggested a timeframe of two to three years. While the threat has increased, SAB currently refrains from specifying exact timelines due to the interaction of multiple variable factors. Russia’s threat to Western countries remains high, and targeted efforts are required to mitigate it. SAB also warns that Russia may attempt to influence Latvia’s upcoming parliamentary elections.

Zviedris concludes that the security situation in Latvia, the region, and globally remains complex and offers little reason for optimism. Russia continues to pursue an aggressive and confrontational approach toward Western countries, with a high number of sabotage incidents and cyber incidents. Russia increasingly believes its own propaganda portraying the West, including Latvia, as a threat. Even a peace in Ukraine would not necessarily change the views of Russia’s elite. In Russia’s worldview, the best defense is attack, and it seeks to weaken the West at both national and international levels.

According to Zviedris, Russia’s long-term goal is to dismantle the rules-based international order and be recognized as a great power. China shares ambitions to reshape the global order, pursuing a strategy of identifying and exploiting vulnerabilities, often under the guise of positive initiatives and cooperation formats.

Addressing Latvia’s population,

Zviedris stresses the importance of unity and support for democratic values,

particularly ahead of elections, and urges citizens not to fall victim to information manipulation. Security, he emphasizes, is the foundation that enables normal life, planning, and prosperity, and safeguarding it is a shared responsibility of the entire society.

SAB notes that its annual report provides an overview of counterintelligence, cybersecurity, intelligence, and classified information protection issues in 2025. The classified part of the report will be reviewed by the Cabinet of Ministers and the Saeima’s National Security Committee, which will also approve SAB’s operational priorities for 2026.

SAB is one of Latvia’s three state security institutions responsible for intelligence and counterintelligence, protection of classified information, supervision of critical information and communication technology infrastructure, and the exchange of classified information with international organizations.

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