Russia will intensify hybrid activities and influence operations in Europe in 2026 as well, according to Māris Cepurītis, Director of the Center for East European Policy Studies and a lecturer at Rīga Stradiņš University, speaking to the LETA news agency.
He noted that in 2026, the regime of Russian dictator Vladimir Putin will not face direct threats to its stability and resilience, while the economic and social pressure caused by sanctions will increase, affecting Russian society and the private sector the most.
Cepurītis pointed out that the Russian regime has significantly distanced itself from society and will continue to maintain its resilience through a high level of repression, including intensified censorship and crackdowns on dissenters. At the same time, Russia will seek to prevent any pronounced anti-regime opposition activities both domestically and abroad.
Describing Russia’s foreign policy objectives, Cepurītis said that Moscow’s primary goal is to use the so-called peace negotiation process to play to the United States, seeking to restore relations to the state they were in before 2014 and 2022, or to rebuild them on a new level through joint economic projects, including in the energy sector. At the same time, Russia will attempt to secure some of the demands put forward at the end of 2021, particularly regarding Ukraine, by limiting its sovereignty, including its ability to join NATO and form other security alliances.
The expert noted that Russia will also try to influence the security environment in neighboring regions by creating conditions that reduce neighboring countries’ ability to defend themselves both against traditional military threats and hybrid threats, thereby preserving opportunities to interfere in these countries’ domestic and foreign policy choices.
Assessing the elections expected in several European countries in 2026, Cepurītis said that Russia’s readiness to influence electoral processes will persist.
He noted that Russia will seek to use both previously employed tools and new ones. In addition to disinformation and influence activities, Russia, according to the expert, will continue more visible, kinetic-type actions, including possible sabotage attempts, unidentified drone overflights, and military demonstrations in the Baltic Sea from both air and naval assets, thereby maintaining pressure on European countries.
Cepurītis explained that through such actions Russia seeks to achieve more favorable policies for itself, including creating strategic dilemmas for European countries so that they focus more on their own security and divert fewer resources to supporting Ukraine. At the same time, these actions test NATO’s and its member states’ responses and exert pressure on societies by creating a sense of threat and encouraging them to turn to political decision-makers—namely, if they cannot defend them, then a possible solution is cooperation with Russia.
Speaking about a potential military conflict with NATO, Cepurītis emphasized that as long as Russia is engaged in the war in Ukraine, its military capabilities are insufficient to confront NATO forces simultaneously. He noted that Russia is a state that seeks to exploit various opportunities and vulnerabilities, which increases the likelihood of conflict, including in the form of hybrid threats. According to the expert, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s statements that Europe must prepare for a full-scale armed conflict “unseen since the time of our grandparents and parents” should be viewed in a mobilizing context, aimed at encouraging NATO member states to invest more in defense, given the trend of declining U.S. involvement in European security.
Cepurītis also pointed out that since the COVID-19 pandemic, information flows within Russia’s and Putin’s ruling elite have become increasingly restricted, as access to the president has been limited to an ever-narrower circle of close associates. He said that the political elite is dominated by individuals willing to support the worldview desired by Putin, which has previously led to miscalculations, including the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. According to the expert, various agencies and institutions attempt to present their actions as effective, including hybrid activities against European countries, which may reduce Putin’s motivation to halt such actions and instead encourage their intensification.
Speaking about Putin’s motivations, Cepurītis said they are shaped by several personal considerations, but in recent years have been dominated by a desire to remain in history as one of the leaders of Russia or the Soviet Union who enabled the country to achieve something significant. The expert added that in this respect, parallels can be drawn with the era of Joseph Stalin’s regime, when power was based on a narrow circle of loyal individuals and repression of dissenters.
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