Despite the frequent calls from Latvian authorities to dissuade residents from travelling to Russia, the number of visits to the aggressor state had doubled in 2024 when compared to the year prior, as concluded in the annual report from the State Security Service (VDD).
The service stresses that people with access to confidential information remain the main targets for Russian special services. VDD has found that a number of Latvian state and municipal officials are still dismissive of the risks that stem from contacts with foreigners, especially when staying in Russia or countries allied with it.
Despite repeated calls by the VDD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs not to travel to Russia, on average almost 2 000 Latvian residents travelled to Russia every month in 2024. In 2023, on average, 1 000 cases of travel of Latvian residents to Russia were recorded every month.
These Latvian citizens subjected themselves to high intelligence and recruitment risks, stresses VDD.
The increase in the number of trips to Russia can be largely explained with the length of the war started by Russia: many Latvian citizens have relatives and assets in Russia. They need to settle formalities and there is no way to delay their trips for any longer, as mentioned in the report.
The VDD report draws attention to the fact that Russian special services aggressively use the opportunity to recruit foreigners on their territory, where they enjoy wide discretion and may not be concerned about the potential interference of Western counter-intelligence services.
The groups of people that Russian special services are particularly interested in recruiting are, for example, law enforcement officials, employees of state administration and municipal institutions, persons whose occupation allows access to information about operations, facilities, personnel, logistics or action plans of the Latvian Army and NATO allied forces.
Similarly, Russia is interested in persons who have served in the USSR armed forces, the people of Latvia, whose interests and ties in Russia allow them to put pressure on them, as well as the people involved in providing support to Ukraine.
Representatives of the aforementioned groups, especially persons related to public administration, should not visit the aggressor state, emphasizes the VDD, recalling that Latvian institutions have limited opportunities to help Latvian nationals in difficulties in Russia.
VDD notes that the Russian Federal Security Service last year continued to engage in migration control measures at border control points both on the Latvian-Russian border and elsewhere in Russia, for example, at major Russian airports. Latvian residents and their private data carriers were also subjected to in-depth checks and interviews. According to the information obtained by VDD, the purpose of these activities was to identify suitable persons for recruitment. According to the information obtained by VDD, the purpose of these activities was to identify suitable persons for recruitment.
In turn, for the implementation of harmful activities, the Russian special services last year most often directly or indirectly recruited Latvian residents who are interested in easy profits, namely, young people – unemployed, students, persons with a criminal past, as well as pro-Kremlin-oriented disadvantaged persons. Such individuals are not usually specially trained, as they are expected to complete simple tasks.
VDD has also analysed the activities of Belarusian special services in the institution’s report. These services continued performing various activities against Latvia.
Regular trips of Latvian residents to this country, despite warnings from VDD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have provided Belarusian special services with a wide range of persons for obtaining intelligence and recruiting. Last year, Latvian authorities recorded on average 5 000 monthly travel cases of Latvian residents to Belarus. The number of visits was facilitated by the visa-free regime introduced by Belarus.
In 2024, Belarusian special services continued to aggressively use the opportunity to recruit foreigners on their territory, emphasizes VDD, recalling that several Latvian nationals who had entered the territory of this unfriendly country were detained in Belarus last year. The Belarusian power structures accused detainees of various criminal offences and used the opportunity to in-depth question the persons about the developments in Latvia.
Some of the detainees, in exchange for dropping the charges, were involved in Belarusian propaganda activities, namely giving interviews praising Belarus and disparaging Latvia on television channels controlled by Aleksander Lukashenko.
Like the Russian special services, the Belarusian special services are interested in obtaining intelligence on critical and military infrastructure, as well as other information of strategic importance that is not publicly available. According to VDD, the efforts of the Belarusian political regime to increase the mobilization and combat readiness of the armed forces should be seen as a threat to Latvia, especially in the context of regional security and NATO’s eastern flank.
In 2024, similarly to previous years, one of the main tasks of the Belarusian special services remained providing the Lukashenko regime with information of a political and economic nature, as well as to suppress opposition currents in Belarusian society, according to VDD.
The Belarusian State Security Committee has implemented measures to create disinformation to be used for the discrediting of Latvia and the maintenance of Belarusian propaganda narratives in the internal audience. For example, Belarus continued to target Latvia with artificially created illegal migration, while disseminating disinformation in the public environment about alleged violence committed by officials of Latvian state institutions and other human rights violations against “refugees”, VDD reports.
Last year, Belarusian special services continued to cooperate with Russian special services, VDD notes.