Opinion piece/Ilona Bērziņa
If someone remade jokes about “slow Estonians” with “slow Latvians” instead, that person would hit close to bullseye – at least in the defence sector. What new projects does the “State Defence Corporation” have in the works? What is being done to develop Latvia’s military industry? How can we keep out air space safe from Russian drones?
In February 2024, Estonia announced the creation of a military industrial park, which will include a factory for the production of different ammo and explosives. We’re not sitting around doing nothing either. As far as we know from Minister of Defence Andris Sprūds, a factory producing components of artillery projectiles, such as modular powder charges, will be opened in Iecava Parish. Moreover – the minister claims that it will be the first factory of this scale in Baltic States. This means Latvia rules and no other Baltic country has accomplished anything of the sort! (This idea was paraphrased slightly from Sprūds’ interview to LETA earlier this summer).
But how, then, should we look at the memorandum of intent signed by Lithuania in April this year with Germany’s Rheinmetall for the opening of a 155 mm artillery shell production plant or the aforementioned Estonian defence industrial park?
Are there but insignificant developments? Then there is the memorandum signed between the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Finance and US military industrial giant Northrop Grumman Corporation.
Military industry and its development are important, but the most important question is – how are we supposed to defend against drone? If anyone thinks the Russian “friendly” drone that crashed in Latvia this September is some lost bird, they are wrong. This explosives-filled apparatus was the first, but definitely not the last. This is why the news about anti-aircraft mobile groups of Latvian Air Forces being stationed in Latgale is good news. Ukrainian forces use special mobile groups to shoot down Russian “Shahed” drones. Turns out, this does not require any dramatic capital investments or mega-expensive equipment. It requires troop training, yes. But I believe our armed forces are covered on that front.
Concerns mainly come from the possibility that the Russian drone wasn’t noticed by anyone, but clearly there is unwillingness to admit mistakes.
The State Border Guard admit they have neither the orders nor the resources to monitor such things.
The command of Latvian National Armed Forces claim: we saw it, we monitored the situation, but we did not shoot it down. This caused scepticism in most residents. The same can be said about the speeches from minister Andris Sprūds.
But this is something Progressive ministers have in common, it seems…
Many will think – how long can you spend deliberating on a drone that ended up crashing on its own. There are, after all, more important things to tackle. Such as the plans to increase all vehicle operation rates by 10%. The roads in many places, but especially in Riga, are as if they have suffered from bombing, but for car owners the state is once again opening their wallets! This is certainly a topic worthy of a separate article, but this time still about the ever-increasing risk of drones amid Russian aggression.
It is not that no one understands what threat to national security these unmanned aircraft can pose. Back in 2016, at the meeting of the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee of the 12th Saeima, it was decided to expand not only the number of no-flight areas, but also to increase the range of institutions that are allowed to forcibly land or shoot down perpetrating aircraft. Eight years ago, possible uses for drones was the transporting of drugs and their smuggling into Latvia; delivery of drugs near prison windows; the risk of such transportation of radioactive substances; the possibility of carrying out sabotage and terrorist attacks; explosive-armed drone attacks on aircraft. Today we can expand the list with many other activities we couldn’t have imagined in the past. For example, intelligence gathering and espionage, which is regularly dealt with in the territories of NATO countries by Russian drones that “accidentally wander” into NATO territory. That’s why all kinds of anti-drone devices are so important.
We’ve heard that one key to the success of Ukrainian forces in battling drones is the troops’ own initiative to improve drones and their capabilities. If the improvement in question brings results, it is already used in the manufacture of drones. And no one is messing with procurement procedures, testing or any other bureaucratic delays. I’ve read that our Air Force have also rebuilt the radar equipment on their own in order to detect foreign drones more clearly and accurately. I would like to hope that Defence Minister Andris Sprūds appreciates their performance. I would also like to hope that the Estonian idea of a “drone wall” – drone equipment on the border of several countries with Russia and Belarus will still be realized.
So far, it seems that neither the interior ministers of Latvia and Lithuania, nor Norway, Poland and Finland, to whom the Estonians presented this idea, are very interested in it. In other words, the technical solution is complicated, it will be necessary to cooperate closely at the trans-national level, rather than quietly roar in your regional field, and in general, why do if you can find a reason and not do it? However, would this not be the right time for defence and home affairs departments to cooperate closely at least in securing the state border? If we can waste public money on such expensive gifts as writing off the half a billion euro debt of airBaltic or overthrowing Rail Baltica in the construction pit, it would certainly be more sensible to invest it in creating an anti-drone solution.